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Where Does Racial Discrimination Occur? An
Experimental Analysis Across Neighborhood
and Housing Unit Characteristics
Andrew Hanson
Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Zackary Hawley
Department of Economics, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX

Abstract
This paper examines racial discrimination across several neighborhood and housing unit characteristics including
racial composition, rent, and distance from the urban core. We find that African Americans face higher rates of
discrimination than whites in a wide range of racially mixed neighborhoods, in higher rent areas, closer to
central cities, and in low vacancy areas. These results are robust to various parameterizations of the local
smoothing empirical specification and within a multivariate nonlinear parametric estimation technique. The
location of discrimination supports the current/future customer prejudice and perceived preference hypotheses
as a cause of discrimination in housing markets but not the landlord taste-based hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) annually receives between 700 and 1000 complaints
alleging discrimination on the basis of race or national origin,2 and spends approximately $25 million on
enforcing Fair Housing Laws. About 2% of all complaints end with a charge of discrimination, and about 1% end
in a referral to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for enforcement. In fiscal year 2010, DOJ actions resulted in over
$1 million in penalties for Fair Housing Law violators, not including out of court settlements.3 Despite the dollars
spent on enforcement and penalties landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage brokers face for violating these
laws, racial discrimination is still apparent in housing markets across the U.S.4 The dollars spent on enforcement
of Fair Housing Laws and the fact that agents still violate them leads to at least two questions: What motivates
agents to discriminate? And, are there ways to reduce the cost of identifying violators?
This paper examines how discrimination changes with neighborhood and housing unit characteristics, which
offers insight into the causes of racial discrimination in housing markets and identifies areas where agents are
most likely to violate Fair Housing Laws. We measure discrimination using data from a within-subjects field
experiment, or matched-pair housing audit of landlords advertising rental housing on-line. The experiment
communicates with landlords via e-mail, using names to signal race, and measures differential response rates
between African Americans and whites. We match our measure of discrimination to data on housing unit and
2010 Census neighborhood characteristics.
We use a local polynomial smoothing estimation procedure to find where in the distribution of characteristics
discrimination is more likely to occur. This estimation method provides a smooth prediction of discrimination
outcomes across various characteristics of the neighborhood or housing unit. Local polynomial smoothing is
advantageous in this setting as it does not assume a functional form for where discrimination may occur, it
allows the data to determine the relationship. We examine several different dimensions of neighborhood and
housing unit characteristics including, racial composition, distance to the city center, rental rates, and vacancy
rates.
The results suggest that there are particular areas within cities that are more prone to higher rates of
discrimination against African American home-seekers. African Americans face higher rates of discrimination
than whites in a wide range of racially mixed neighborhoods, in higher rent areas, closer in to the center city,
and in low vacancy areas. The different locations of increased discrimination provide evidence that supports
several hypotheses on the cause of discrimination. Generally, the results suggest current/future customer
prejudice or perceived preference as a cause of discrimination and do not support landlord taste as a cause. The
results also suggest that targeting enforcement efforts to particular areas of cities may help to reduce costs.
The next section of the paper is a discussion of the previous research on housing market discrimination, and
describes how examining where discrimination occurs can inform the causes of
discrimination. Section 3 describes the experimental design and neighborhood data. Section 4 outlines the
methodology for examining discrimination across neighborhood characteristics using non-parametric
estimation. Section 5 presents the results, and the final section of the paper concludes.

2. Background and causes of discrimination
Discrimination against racial minorities in the housing market is well documented by experimental
studies.5 These studies typically use data from pairs of actors that visit real estate agent offices on separate
occasions and record treatment to researchers. Matched pair, or within-subjects experiments, often referred to

as audits, began with Yinger (1986) and continue to be used in the literature to study discrimination today.
Other studies that use data from in-person, matched pair experiments include Yinger (1991), Roychoudhury and
Goodman (1992), Page (1995), Ondrich et al. (1998), Ondrich et al. (1999), Ondrich et al. (2000), and Ondrich et
al. (2003), Choi et al. (2005), Zhao (2005), and Zhao et al. (2006). More recently, correspondence studies that
use names to identify race, and e-mail communication, have appeared in the literature. These studies maintain
the advantages of the experimental design, but avoid some of the problems associated with using in-person
actors (see Heckman (1998) and Heckman and Siegelman (1993) for a detailed critique of in-person
experiments). Studies that use e-mail based communication to study discrimination in the housing market
include Carpusor and Loges (2006), Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008), Ahmed et al. (2008), Ahmed and
Hammarstedt (2009), Ewans et al. (forthcoming), Ahmed et al. (2010), Bosch et al. (2010), Hanson and Hawley
(2011), and Hanson et al. (2011).
All of the literature that examines discrimination in the housing market finds that discrimination occurs against
minority clients to some degree. The literature examines a variety of ways that housing agents may practice
unequal treatment of minority clients, including steering, providing information on or showing additional units,
or asking for future visit opportunities. The Hanson et al. (2011) study even examines the text of landlord replies
to inquires about rental housing to show that landlords use more positive language and are more descriptive
about units when replying to white customers.
We extend this literature along the lines of Yinger (1986) to examine the characteristics of neighborhoods where
discrimination happens, and use this to inform the likely cause of discrimination. Yinger (1986) hypothesizes
three causes of discrimination in housing markets, and how they relate to the racial composition of
neighborhoods.6
The first hypothesis Yinger describes is that agents (landlords) discriminate because of their own tastes or
prejudice in dealing with minority clients. Yinger points out that this cause of discrimination may vary with
landlord characteristics. For our purposes, because we do not have data on landlord characteristics, this cause of
discrimination should result in a constant relationship between neighborhood characteristics and discrimination.
The second hypothesis is that landlords discriminate because they act on behalf of prejudice customers (current
or future tenants). This cause of discrimination is driven by statistical discrimination as described by Phelps
(1972). Statistical discrimination implies an agent (landlord) uses past experiences to formulate the expected
payoff for each potential home-seeker and selects a lessee by profit maximization. This type of discrimination
may also be linked to landlords attempting to prevent the surrounding neighborhood from “tipping” beyond an
acceptable minority share for white residents, as described in Card et al. (2008). Once a neighborhood reaches a
tipping point share of minorities, it tends to become all minority residents, as whites find the neighborhood
unacceptable. Another form of perceived prejudice that landlords may react to is from local public goods
provision. Alesina et al. (1999) show that areas with more ethnic fragmentation spend less on ‘productive’ public
goods, such as education, roads, sewers, and trash pickup. If landlords care about the level of local public goods
provided in their area, they may intentionally try to keep minorities from locating in their communities in order
to keep the level of local public goods high.
Lastly, the landlord may treat minority and white clients differently because of what they perceive to be
different preferences for neighborhoods or housing units among these groups. This would again be considered
statistical discrimination by the definition in Phelps (1972). Yinger points out, and the Card et al. (2008) study
confirms, that whites have a preference for neighborhoods with a vast white majority of residents. African
Americans, on the other hand, have preference for integrated neighborhoods.

3. Experimental design and data
The key elements of studying where housing market discrimination occurs are an unbiased measure of
discrimination, and data on local neighborhood characteristics. Our unbiased measure of discrimination comes
from a field experiment conducted by Hanson and Hawley (2011). For data on neighborhood characteristics, we
match the address of housing units in Hanson and Hawley (2011) to 2010 census tract level neighborhood
characteristics using ArcGIS software.
The Hanson and Hawley (2011) field experiment is a within-subjects, or matched pair audit correspondence
study, of landlords across the United States.7 The data come from landlords of rental properties advertised on
Craigslist.org. Craigslist allows participants to place and reply to on-line advertisements specific to local markets
for jobs, housing, companionship, and other goods and services, although the experiment uses only listings
pertaining to the rental housing market. Each landlord is sent two emails, one from an email address associated
with a white name and one email from an address with an African American name. The experiment design relies
on the names of the potential renters to signal race to the landlord.
The fictitious renters' names come from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who use Massachusetts birth
certificate data from 1974 to 1979 to identify names highly associated with each race. The first names used to
designate a white renter are Brad, Brendan, Brett, Matthew, Neil, Geoffrey, Todd, Greg, and Jay. The first names
used to identify an African American renter are Darnell, Hakim, Jamal, Jermaine, Kareem, Leroy, Rasheed,
Tremayne, and Tyrone. The last names for white renters are Davis, Ryan, Murphy, O'Brien, Baker, McCarthy,
Young, Jones, and Wright. The last names used to represent African American renters are Johnson, Washington,
Robinson, Jackson, Hall, Parker, Williams, Jones, and Cooper.
The experiment consists of 4728 audits, or 9456 e-mail inquiries to advertisements for rental housing from
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco.
All e-mail inquiries are sent between 9 am and 12 pm on the day after a landlord posts an advertisement (always
a Wednesday). Inquiries are sent from g-mail account addresses in the following
format: firstname.lastname.###@gmail.com, where ### is a three-digit number unique to each name. The
overall response rate to e-mail inquiries is 53.9%, with 63.6% of landlords responding to at least one e-mail
inquiry from a pair of e-mails.
We use approximately 2000 audits from the original experiment that include one African American and one
white name, the exact number depends on the neighborhood characteristic we examine.8 We examine
discrimination across neighborhood demographics by identifying the addresses of the advertised housing units,
and matching them to census information. The neighborhood information is determined at the census tract
level. The address for each of the rental properties is geo-coded and identified with a unique census tract. With
the census tract id information, we match the 2010 census data for each location and corresponding audit.

4. Estimating discrimination rates across neighborhood characteristics
We use the within-subjects experimental design to determine if a given landlord treats email inquiries equally or
discriminates by only replying to one e-mail. To measure discrimination across characteristics, we calculate the
discrimination rate against African Americans and whites. The discrimination rate against African Americans
(whites) is the ratio of landlords that responded to the white (African American) home-seeker but not to the
African American (white) home-seeker divided by the number of audits.
𝐴𝐴
𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
=

#𝑜𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟
#𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠

We calculate a discrimination rate for each “bin” in our non-parametric specification, where the size of the bin
depends on the characteristic in question and the distribution of each variable. This means that we are
aggregating landlords that rent units in census tracts with similar characteristics to create a discrimination rate.
The original experiment measures discrimination at the landlord level, using one unit per landlord so that we are
not counting discriminating (or non-discriminating) landlords more than once.
There are four different characteristics for which we evaluate the changes in the discrimination
rates. Table 1 provides a description and summary statistics for each of the neighborhood characteristics. The
most influential neighborhood characteristic for discrimination studies is the population racial composition. We
use the percentage of white residents within the neighborhood as the characteristic of interest. The average
percentage of white residents in the sample is 61.8%. The second characteristic is how far the neighborhood is
from the city center. We calculate the distance measure as straight-line distance from the centroid of the
neighborhood, or census tract, to the tallest building for each respective city. The average distance to the city
center for units in our sample is 10.6 miles.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable

Description

Obs.

Percentage of white
residents
Distance to city center

The percentage of white residents.
The straight line distance to the city
center (proxied by tallest building)
in miles.
The advertised rental rate set by the
landlord.
The ratio of the advertised rental
rate divided by the median rent for
the city.
The percentage of rental properties
that are for rent and vacant.
The percentage of landlords who
only responded to the African
American client in the audit pair.
The percentage of landlords who
only responded to the White client
in the audit pair.
= 1 if rental location is within the
urbanized area

Rental rate
Rental rate ratio

Vacancy rate
Gross discrimination rate
against whites
Gross discrimination rate
against African
Americans
Central city

Mean

Min

2029 0.618

St.
dev.
0.236

Max

2207 10.605

10.881

0.136 113.495

0.005 1

2009 1488.04 769.37

250

8750

2009 1.080

0.437

0.169 4.714

2026 0.042

0.037

0

0.591

2207 7.612

26.525

0

100

2207 13.14

33.791

0

100

2207 0.977

0.147

0

1

Most units advertised on craigslist include an advertised rent, and we use this information, combined with data
on city median rents to create a ratio of median rent for each unit in our sample.9 We use a ratio, rather than
the nominal value of rent for each unit, to control for the vast differences in nominal rent values across the
areas studied. The rent ratio provides insight to the level of discrimination in higher public good areas, as these
qualities of the neighborhood are usually reflected in higher rents. The average landlord advertised rental rate is
$1488.04, and the average rental ratio is 1.08, close to the median rent for the city.

To understand how the supply of rental units in the neighborhood may affect discrimination, we calculate the
vacancy rate as the number of for rent vacant rental units divided by the number of rental households.10 The
average vacancy rate for neighborhoods in our sample is 4.2%.
Table 1 also shows the gross discrimination rate against African Americans as 13.1% which is the percentage of
audits where the landlord only responded to the white potential client. The gross discrimination rate against
whites, or the percentage of audits where the landlord only responded to the African American potential client,
is 7.6%. The indicator variable for central city is unity for housing units lying inside an urbanized area.11
Table 2 summarizes how each of the neighborhood characteristics we examine relates to the Yinger hypotheses
on the causes of discrimination. The simplest hypothesis is the landlord taste-based discrimination. The taste
hypothesis states that the level of discrimination should not vary with the characteristics of the neighborhood
but only due to the characteristic of the home-seeker. The resulting expectation is constant discrimination
against African American home-seekers and no discrimination against white home-seekers.
Table 2. Cause of discrimination hypotheses by neighborhood characteristic.
Landlord taste
Racial
composition

Discrimination
against African
Americans
everywhere

Distance to
city center

No discrimination
against whites

Increasing
discrimination
against whites, as
white population
declines

Discrimination
against African
Americans
everywhere

Discriminate against
African Americans in
neighborhoods
further from the city
center
Discriminate against
whites in
neighborhoods
closer to city center
Discriminate against
African Americans
more as rental rate
increases
No discrimination
against whites

No discrimination
against whites

Rental rate

Current or future
customer
Decreasing
discrimination
against African
Americans as white
population declines

Discrimination
against African
Americans
everywhere
No discrimination
against whites

Prevent tipping
Discriminate against
African

Perceived
preference/budget
Discriminate against
African

Americans in
neighborhoods rises
sharply in tipping
range, falls on either
side of this range
Discriminate against
whites in
neighborhoods rises
sharply in tipping
range, falls on either
side of this range
Not relevant

Americans in
neighborhoods that are
vast majority white

Not relevant

Discriminate against
whites in neighborhoods
closer to city center

Not relevant

Discriminate against
African Americans more
as rental rate

Not Relevant

No discrimination
against whites, or
discrimination at lowest
rents

Increasing discrimination
against whites, as white
population declines

Discriminate against
African Americans in
neighborhoods further
from the city center

Vacancy rate

Discrimination
against African
Americans
everywhere
No discrimination
against whites

Reduced
discrimination
against African
Americans as
vacancy rate rises
Less discrimination
against whites as
vacancy rates rise

Not relevant

Discrimination against
African Americans as
vacancy rate falls

Not relevant

More discrimination
against whites as
vacancy rates rise

The second hypothesis tested is the current or future customer's prejudice. Under this hypothesis, landlords
should discriminate more against one race when the surrounding population is of a different race. If the belief of
the landlord is that current or future tenants who live in more homogenous neighborhoods want to continue to
live in such neighborhoods, then landlords may discriminate more when the race of the home-seeker does not
match the current demographic. An additional hypothesis that provides a very similar story is the tipping
phenomenon. Tipping may appear as a desire for integration at very high percentage majority population
followed by a rapid increase in discrimination against minority home-seekers as the neighborhood approaches
the tipping point. This behavior is consistent with the current population trying to ‘save’ the neighborhood. After
the tipping point is achieved, the hypothesis predicts a decline in discrimination rates against minority clients as
the majority leaves and the neighborhood becomes fully integrated.
The final hypothesis is the perceived preference or budget of a perspective client. If perceived customer
preferences are driving landlord discrimination, we should find discrimination against whites in majorityminority neighborhoods, and discrimination against African Americans only in vast majority white
neighborhoods. Landlords in neighborhoods with very high percentages of white residents may not believe that
an African American would truly want to live in their unit. The email inquiry may not be seen as genuine interest
and thus the landlord does not respond. The perception is that each race may prefer a small amount of
integration, but in neighborhoods with virtually no integration landlords may not see an inquiry as genuine
interest.
The primary method for analyzing the audit data is a local polynomial smoothing technique. This estimation
strategy combines the simplicity of a parametric method, Weighted Least Squares (WLS), with the flexibility of a
non-linear regression technique. The estimation fits multiple WLS regressions to ‘localized’ bins of the data
building a more flexible result that is determined by the variation within the data, point-by-point.
𝑛

𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 𝛽)2
𝑖=1

The data within the bin that surrounds the point of interest are weighted with increased importance given the
‘closer’ data. The same estimation is applied for all data points in the distribution, shifting ‘localized’ bins
accordingly. The resulting smooth function, 𝑓, is a compilation of each point's WLS predicted value.

𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖
The local polynomial smoothing method, introduced by Cleveland (1979) and refined by Cleveland and Devlin
(1988), places the resulting fitted values into a plot or functional form that is not possible to estimate with
parametric techniques. The biggest benefit to using smoothing as opposed to standard linear regression is that it
does not require a global functional form assumption of the underlying distribution of the data, only for each bin
of the data. An additional benefit of the smoothing is that many of the parameters such as the degree of

polynomial, bandwidth (size of the ‘localized’ bin), or weights, are flexible in the estimation. We choose local
polynomial over other techniques, such as spline estimation, because it allows the data to determine where (or
if any) structural breaks occur.
The local polynomial smoothing technique also allows for confidence interval calculation. We use the confidence
intervals to determine significant differences in the discrimination rates against either race along the
distribution of the characteristic. These differences inform the plausibility of the underlying causes.
Using local polynomial smoothing requires us to make three choices—the degree of polynomial estimate within
bins, the bandwidth around each point, and the weights assigned to other points around each data
point. Cleveland (1979) discusses choosing the degree of polynomial and finds that linear smoothing is almost
always an adequate balance between flexibility and computational ease. The choice of higher degree
polynomials does not change the results and only makes the intuition of the method more cumbersome. We
must also choose a bandwidth around each observation to define how much of the data to use in each
regression, we use the “rule of thumb” bandwidth.12 The Appendix A examines sensitivity of our results to this
choice. The weights are kernel distributed.13 DiNardo and Tobias (2001) point out that, in general, nonparametric estimates are not sensitive to the choice of how nearby observations are weighted.
The local polynomial smoothing method is not a new empirical method in urban economics. Meese and Wallace
(1991) use the nonparametric technique to evaluate hedonic price models and residential housing price
indices. McMillen (1996) applies the locally weighted estimates to land value data from Chicago over the past
150 years. The flexibility of the model helps provide insights on the polycentric nature of Chicago. More
recently, McMillen and Redfearn (2010) show how hypothesis testing can be done with the local polynomial
smoothing method. We are advancing this line of literature by using this flexible empirical method to analyze
the location of discrimination across urban areas.

5. Results
5.1. Percent of white residents
Fig. 1 shows the discrimination rates across the racial composition of the neighborhood surrounding rental
properties in our data. The discrimination rate against African American home-seekers is significantly higher
than against white home-seekers across the full range of neighborhoods. Discrimination against white homeseekers does not fluctuate across neighborhood composition, which suggests racial composition is not
important in determining the level of discrimination against whites.

Fig. 1. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents.

If we start at a location where the neighborhood comprises 100% white residents and slowly add minority
households, we see the discrimination rate against African American home-seekers rises steadily. The current
residents may be fearful of their neighborhood tipping, as the discrimination rate reaches a plateau at around
80% white residents. This result is consistent with Card et al. (2008) as most of the neighborhoods showed
tipping between 10 and 20% minority. There is no drop off in discrimination rates between 80% and 30% white
residents which is not consistent with the expectation of tipping concerns. African American home-seekers face
similar discrimination rates for a large range of mixed neighborhoods. Below 30% white residents, the
discrimination rate falls, implying residents in neighborhoods with a large percentage of minority residents do
not discriminate against African Americans as much as the landlords in mixed neighborhoods. This figure is not
consistent with current or future customer prejudice, since the expectation under this hypothesis is higher levels
of discrimination in largely white or African American neighborhoods. It is also not consistent with landlord
taste-based discrimination as the rate of discrimination does significantly change with the racial composition.
Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 show examples of different city specific cases for discrimination by the percent of
white residents in the surrounding neighborhood, as discrimination may differ across the distribution in each
city.14 In Atlanta, the discrimination rate against white home-seekers falls as the percentage of white residents
becomes larger. This is consistent with customer prejudice against living with white residents. Additionally, there
is only a small significant difference in discrimination rates between African Americans and whites for Atlanta,
and the location of this difference is consistent with a tipping concern story. As the minority population grows,
so does the discrimination rate, but the rate begins to decline at around 75% white residents.

Fig. 2. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents Atlanta sub-case.

Fig. 3. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents Boston sub-case.

Fig. 4. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents Chicago sub-case.

Fig. 5. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents District of Colombia sub-case.
Fig. 3 describes the Boston sub-case. There seems to be a constant discrimination rate difference against African
Americans in Boston. Over a wide range of neighborhood compositions, below 85% white, the predicted
difference is stable.15 Above 85 or 90%, the discrimination rate against African Americans does fall slightly this is
again suggestive of a neighborhood tipping concern story. The Chicago sub-case tells a different
story. Fig. 4 shows a desire for integration in neighborhoods that are highly white concentrated, as the rate of
discrimination is not statistically different between white or African American home-seekers. However, as the
minority share continues to climb, the difference becomes significant and peaks around 50%. This pattern may
be consistent with perceived preference discrimination. Landlords may believe African Americans want to live in
either mainly white neighborhoods or largely minority neighborhoods with less desire to be in the middle.
Fig. 5 presents the District of Columbia sub-case. The highest rates of discrimination appear in the white
concentrated neighborhoods and falls off steadily with the percentage of white residents. This city's sub-case is
most consistent with the customer prejudice hypothesis. Landlords may believe that current neighbors or future
clients will not appreciate integration in their neighborhoods and these preferences can produce a picture like
the D.C. sub-case.

5.2. Distance to city center
With the stark difference in housing structures and social interaction within urban and suburban neighborhoods,
examining discrimination rates by distance from center of the city may provide insight into how these factors
influence discrimination. Fig. 6 shows the discrimination rate against African American home-seekers is always
higher than whites across the entire distance distribution, although the rates do pinch together slightly at
around 20 to 30 miles from the city center. Again, since the individual cities vary greatly on the types of
neighborhoods at various distances, we look at the individual sub-cases to reveal more about potential causes.16

Fig. 6. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center.
Fig. 7 shows the Atlanta sub-case. This figure shows a preference for integration very close to the city center as
well as in the suburbs between 15 and 30 miles away. Interestingly, there are two ranges of distances for which
the discrimination rates are significantly different. In the urban setting from about 2 miles to 15 miles out and in
the outer suburb ring (between 30 and 40 miles), where the discrimination rate against African American homeseekers is statistically larger than against white home-seekers. This type of pattern may suggest customer
prejudice as the landlords are likely aware of the clientele of those neighborhoods.17 The Chicago sub-case is
similar as shown in Fig. 9.

Fig. 7. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center Atlanta sub-case.

Fig. 8. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center Boston sub-case.

Fig. 9. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center Chicago sub-case.
Fig. 8 describes the discrimination rate difference across distance for the Boston sub-case. In this case there
does not seem to be a preference for integration near the city center but as the distance is increased the
difference in discrimination rate goes away. Fig. 10 shows the District of Columbia sub-case which is similar to
Boston in that there is a statistically significant difference very close to the city center. This difference disappears
as the distance increases, but unlike Boston, in the further suburbs the difference reemerges.

Fig. 10. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center District of Colombia sub-case.

5.3. Advertised rental rate
Fig. 11 presents the discrimination rates over the advertised rent relative to the median rent. At low rents
relative to the median, there is no statistical difference in differential treatment against white or African
American home-seekers. There is a large increase in discrimination against white home-seekers in the lower
range. It may be that landlords do not believe the typical white customer will want to live in a low-rent area, and
discriminates against them due to perceived preference.

Fig. 11. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio.
When the rent ratio reaches around 0.75, or at rents above 75% of the median, landlords start to discriminate
more against African Americans than their white counterparts. This difference in discrimination rates continues
to rise and peaks at around 1.5, or at rents that are 150% of the median. This type of result is suggestive of
statistical discrimination, if the landlord has a perception of ability to pay from the racial group. Interestingly, as
the rent ratio continues to increase the discrimination rates become closer and eventually not statistically
different from each other. This suggests in very expensive areas landlords are not favoring African Americans or
whites disproportionately, at least through initial email contact. This does not occur until very high levels of rent,
where even inquiring about a rental unit may send a strong signal about ability to pay.
In the city-specific cases, Atlanta (Fig. 12) and Boston (Fig. 13) are similar to the national average. The Chicago
(Fig. 14) and D.C. (Fig. 15) sub-cases, there is statistically significant discrimination at the lower part of the rent
ratio distribution that does not exist in the national sample. Although it is not entirely clear what is driving these
differences, part of the reason may be the presence of other minority populations in Chicago and D.C. in low
rent areas.

Fig. 12. Local Linear smoothing by rent ratio Atlanta sub-case.

Fig. 13. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio Boston sub-case.

Fig. 14. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio Chicago sub-case.

Fig. 15. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio District of Colombia sub-case.

5.4. Neighborhood vacancy rate
Fig. 16 examines discrimination across neighborhood vacancy rates. After a slow initial decline, the
discrimination rate against African Americans rises sharply in neighborhoods starting with about 12% vacant
units. This type of result is consistent with personal prejudice rather than other statistical discrimination
hypotheses, as a profit maximizing landlord should rent to any client where marginal benefit exceeds marginal
cost, and a client paying rent should be superior to leaving a unit empty in nearly all cases.

Fig. 16. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate.
The Chicago sub-case (Fig. 19) shows a similar pattern to the national average, but all of the other city specific
figures are substantially different. In Atlanta (Fig. 17) and the District of Columbia (Fig. 20), we find statistically
meaningful discrimination against African Americans at low vacancy levels, and no discrimination at higher levels
of vacancy—consistent with a statistical explanation, and not with landlord tastes, contrary to the national
sample. Boston (Fig. 18) has the odd pattern of no discrimination at either high or low vacancy rates, but fairly
constant discrimination in mid-level vacancy areas, although the vacancy distribution as a whole is shifted to the
left.

Fig. 17. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate Atlanta sub-case.

Fig. 18. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate Boston sub-case.

Fig. 19. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate Chicago sub-case.

Fig. 20. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rate District of Colombia sub-case.

5.5. Multivariate parametric results
We use a multivariate nonlinear parametric model using simple polynomial to check that the nonlinear
relationships shown in the bivariate nonparametric estimation stay consistent. This robustness check increases
the confidence of our estimation strategy and results. Table 3 shows the nonlinear parametric results. We
estimate a linear probability model with additional neighborhood and unit characteristic control variables such
as number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and the percentage of college graduates in the census tract. The
dependent variable is a binary response variable with unity implying a response was received. All of the previous
unit and neighborhood characteristics are used as independent variables both together (column 1) and
separately (columns 3–6).

Table 3. Response rate by unit and neighborhood characteristics.

African American (AA)
Percentage of white residents in the neighborhood
Square of percentage of white residents
AA ∗ Percentage of white residents
AA ∗ Square of percentage of white residents
Distance to city center
Square of distance to city center
AA ∗ Distance to city center
AA ∗ Square of distance to city center
Percentage of median rent in the city
Square of percentage of median rent in the city
AA ∗ Percentage of median rent in the city
AA ∗ Square of percentage of median rent in the city
Vacancy rate in the neighborhood
Square of vacancy rate in the neighborhood

(1)
Combined
effect

(2)
African
American
only effect

0.0106
[0.10]
0.7137***
[3.52]
− 0.5993***
[− 3.23]
− 0.2842
[− 0.99]
0.2742
[1.05]
0.0008
[0.36]
0.0000
[0.68]
0.0000
[0.02]
− 0.0000
[− 0.11]
0.1518**
[2.08]
− 0.0523**
[− 2.43]
− 0.0525
[− 0.52]
0.0122
[0.40]
− 1.1315**
[− 2.16]
3.6450**

− 0.0542***
[− 3.49]

(3)
Percentage of
white
residents
effect
0.0131
[0.18]
0.7517***
[3.71]
− 0.5783***
[− 3.12]
− 0.2866
[− 1.01]
0.2511
[0.96]

(4)
Distance
effect

(5)
Median rent
ratio effect

(6)
Vacancy
rate effect

− 0.0530**
[− 2.03]

− 0.0126
[− 0.19]

− 0.0838***
[− 2.92]

0.0017
[0.82]
0.0000
[0.46]
− 0.0001
[− 0.02]
− 0.0000
[− 0.05]
0.1240*
[1.80]
− 0.0475**
[− 2.25]
− 0.0558
[− 0.58]
0.0135
[0.45]
− 1.3643***
[− 2.73]
4.0341***

[2.35]
[2.65]
0.8717
0.8206
[1.18]
[1.18]
AA ∗ Square of vacancy rate in the neighborhood
− 1.4698
− 1.3510
[− 0.67]
[− 0.63]
Bedrooms
− 0.0133
− 0.0117
− 0.0109
− 0.0133
− 0.0119
− 0.0138
[− 1.42]
[− 1.25]
[− 1.17]
[− 1.43]
[− 1.27]
[− 1.48]
Bathrooms
− 0.0022
− 0.0025
− 0.0013
− 0.0029
− 0.0013
− 0.0034
[− 0.22]
[− 0.25]
[− 0.13]
[− 0.29]
[− 0.13]
[− 0.34]
Single family
0.0301
0.0421*
0.0424*
0.0286
0.0423*
0.0357
[1.28]
[1.83]
[1.84]
[1.22]
[1.83]
[1.54]
Apartment
− 0.0605***
− 0.0647*** − 0.0625***
− 0.0624***
− 0.0635***
− 0.0663***
[− 3.29]
[− 3.53]
[− 3.42]
[− 3.40]
[− 3.47]
[− 3.62]
Percentage college educated in neighborhood
− 0.0651
− 0.0223
− 0.1088*
0.0085
− 0.0125
− 0.0343
[− 1.01]
[− 0.43]
[− 1.85]
[0.16]
[− 0.22]
[− 0.65]
Constant
0.4039***
0.6375***
0.4465***
0.6124***
0.5644***
0.6927***
[4.94]
[22.81]
[7.93]
[19.02]
[10.66]
[19.99]
Observations
4042
4060
4058
4050
4060
4052
R-squared
0.021
0.009
0.015
0.012
0.011
0.012
F Statistic
3.955
6.160
6.258
4.769
4.709
4.864
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary response, where unity implies an email response received. Neighborhood is defined as a census tract. Distance
is the straight line distance in number of miles to the tallest building in the city. Median rent is at the city level by number of bedrooms; percentage of
median rent is the simple ratio of reported rent to the median rent. P-values reported in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level respectively.
AA ∗ Vacancy rate in the neighborhood

The parametric results show strong support for the local polynomial smoothing estimation strategy. The
direction and magnitude of the results buttress the non-parametric figures. For example, the percentage of
white residents in the neighborhood has a positive and strongly significant impact on the probability of a
response controlling for race and the interaction of race and white residence percentage. This shows the
discrimination rate against African Americans is much higher as the percentage of white residents in the
neighborhood increases (from zero to one). The square of the percent of white residents shows the effect of
additional white residents falls for neighborhoods that are more than 50% white. This result mirrors the finding
in Fig. 1, while controlling for other covariates that may affect landlord response.
The remaining parametric results also follow the nonparametric findings; however, some are not quite as
statistically precise (although most remain statistically meaningful at the ten percent level). Higher rents lead to
higher rates of discrimination against African Americans but at a decreasing rate around the critical value of 1.5
times the median rent. Likewise, very low or high vacancy rates lead to increases in the discrimination rate
against African Americans around the critical value of 15%. These patterns are similar to the nonparametric
figures. The distance measure does not show statistical significance in any specification but the sign and
magnitude are congruent with the nonparametric results.

6. Conclusion
We use a non-parametric estimation strategy to examine racial discrimination across neighborhood and housing
unit characteristics. We examine how discrimination rates fluctuate within the distribution of racial composition,
distance to city center, affordability, and vacancy rates. African American home-seekers are discriminated
against at a higher rate than whites in neighborhoods that are racially mixed. They also face larger
discrimination rates in areas with rents near or above the median rent for the city, as well as in areas with low or
very high vacancy rates. Higher discrimination rates against African Americans are also observed in
neighborhoods that are located very close to the center of the city or in the first ring of suburbs.
While it is extremely difficult to determine the exact cause of discrimination, the results do suggest that landlord
taste is not the central cause of discrimination rates against home-seekers. In general, the perceived preference
or current/future customer prejudice cause is much more plausible. Both of these hypotheses of discrimination
are in line with statistical discrimination. While still illegal, the results suggest it is the landlords' intent to
maximize profits by treating the marginal home-seeker like a perceived typical group member.
This study provides potential hot-spots for discrimination such as neighborhoods in the ‘tipping’ range, with low
or very high vacancy rates, and with rents that are near or above the median rent for the city. This knowledge of
where discrimination occurs is helpful for targeting future enforcement activities or for informing the choice of
locations for public sessions on how to spot and report discriminatory behavior. We should note, however, that
it is possible that a different sample of cities would produce different results, even if those cities have similar
demographic and economic characteristics as our sample. It is possible that other factors about metropolitan
areas such as segregation, commuting patterns, immigration, or local public services would play an important
role that we do not capture in our data.
Our work does suggest that studies of discrimination should consider taking into account the types of
neighborhoods in the sample selection process, as oversampling from certain neighborhoods may be consistent
with finding above or below average discrimination rates. The literature and enforcement of Fair Housing Laws
should also consider how access to specific types of neighborhoods may have a differential impact on housing
outcomes than a general level of discrimination.
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Appendix A. Robustness of estimates to bandwidth choice
The choice of bandwidth may be the most commonly criticized parameter selection for local smoothing
techniques. We test how sensitive our primary results are to changing the rule of thumb bandwidth in the local
polynomial regression. We examine how choosing a smaller (one-half the size) and larger (twice the size)
bandwidth changes our results.
Fig. A1 shows the discrimination rate across the percent of white residents' distribution using half and double
the rule-of-thumb bandwidth, respectively. As Fig. A1 shows, the results are quite similar to the results for the
standard rule of thumb bandwidth. Mixed neighborhoods still retain the higher discrimination rate differences
with lower discrimination rates against African Americans in the largely majority neighborhood and the largely
minority neighborhoods. Similarly, Fig. A2 illustrates the discrimination rates with half and double the rule-ofthumb bandwidth, against African American and white home-seekers along the distance to the city center
distribution. Again the choice of bandwidth does not seem to affect the pattern that we observe.

Fig. A1. Local linear smoothing by percentage of white residents robustness checks.

Fig. A2. Local linear smoothing by distance from city center robustness checks.
Fig. A3, Fig. A4 show the bandwidth robustness checks across the rent ratio and vacancy rate distribution. We
find that the bandwidth choice does not change the distribution of discrimination substantially across any of
these attributes. We also check the robustness of the results with the degree of polynomial and the kernel

function choice for the local smoothing estimation. The choice of these parameters does not significantly alter
the main conclusions described above.

Fig. A3. Local linear smoothing by rent ratio robustness checks.

Fig. A4. Local linear smoothing by vacancy rates robustness checks.
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Tel.: + 1 414 288 5822.
State-level Fair Housing Assistance Programs (FHAP) also handle discrimination complaints. These programs
receive an additional 3000–4000 complaints annually. More of these complaints (7–8%) end up in a
charge of discrimination, but fewer are referred to the Department of Justice for enforcement.
3
The DOJ recently settled with Bank of America for $335 million in response to allegations that it's Countrywide
Financial subsidiary practiced discrimination against African American and Hispanic borrowers by
charging them higher fees and steering them into subprime mortgages (New York Times, “Country Wide
Will Settle Bias Lawsuit”, December 21, 2011).
4
Three decades of academic work confirms that racial discrimination exists in housing markets. See Yinger
(1986) for a classic example, and Hanson and Hawley (2011) for a recent example with citations to other
newer studies.
5
Experimental studies of racial discrimination have become the standard in separately identifying racial
discrimination from other confounding factors. Other studies that use observational data on home
prices (sales, self-reported, or assessed) suffer from bias caused by correlation between unobserved
factors at the unit, person, and neighborhood level with outcomes of interest and race. While we see
value in these studies for their ability to examine important outcomes, we question the magnitudes
associated with the level of discrimination they find.
6
Yinger puts these in the context of discrimination by real estate agents, but the concepts apply equally well to
landlords of rental properties, which we examine here.
7
For details of the original experiment see Hanson and Hawley (2011).
8
The sample size is also limited by ArcGIS software not recognizing some addresses information, and by some
landlords offering incomplete address information.
9
The median rent data come from HUD. The ACS provides a self-reported gross rent available at the county level
for 2010. Using either data produces the same result.
10
The vacancy data come from Census. The ACS provides the number of for rent properties and the number of
vacant for rent properties. The vacancy rate is a simple ratio of these two measures.
11
An urbanized area is defined by the Census Bureau as an area with 50,000 or more people and a densely
settled core of census tracts or blocks along with adjacent territory with lower population density.
12
The lpoly statistical package in STATA 12 provides a “rule of thumb” method for bandwidth choice. We follow
this choice as a starting point and provide robustness checks for this choice.
13
We use the Epanechnikov kernel which is standard and applies increased weights to the observations as the
distance from the point of interest falls to zero.
14
We picked examples that were representative. The Atlanta sub-case is similar to Dallas and Houston. The
Boston sub-case resembles Seattle and New York. The Chicago sub-case is comparable to San Francisco
and Los Angeles.
15
Even though the confidence intervals begin to expand at around 20% white residents, the predicted values are
still relatively flat. This is due to the relatively small sample size in those neighborhood types for Boston.
2

16

These locations are representative of different patterns for the cities in our data. Atlanta is similar to Chicago,
Seattle, and San Francisco, where Boston is aligned with District of Columbia, Los Angeles, New York,
Dallas and Houston.
17
In Atlanta, distance interacts with racial composition of neighborhoods. A basic description of the city is that
there is an inner ring of African American majority neighborhoods surrounded by the heavily mixed
urban area. Further out is a ring of more heavily African American populated suburbs encompassed by a
ring of white populated neighborhoods.

